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International human rights law sets out the entitlements and freedoms of individ-
uals to start a family which is considered to be a natural and fundamental group 
unit of society. Foundation of a family is usually related to the idea of creation and 
continuation of life that involves the procreative capacity of family members and 
is consolidated through the actual act of procreation. However, in the practice, it 
means that some individuals may face with procreation problems that are obstacles 
to the efficient realization of the procreative right. The law has a solution for over-
coming the problem as it guarantees access to the assisted procreative facilities that 
have the aim to enable procreation. Thus, the procreation becomes possible with the 
involvement of the third party. It is especially noticeable in the case where the law 
allows the donation of the reproductive cells or childbearing for potential procre-
ators (surrogacy). Those procreation novelties deprived the procreation of its private 
characteristics and made procreation public. The most importantly the law enabled 
that human body, with it related the act of childbearing and child itself become the 
subject of various agreements between adults. That leads to the question of whether 
the procreation right should be limited, as it makes possible that human being and 
parts of its body become the commodity. To answer that question it is needed to de-
termine the scope of the procreation right itself, and view it in relation to the compet-
ing rights of all subjects in the procreation process. The analysis of the moral aspect 
of the procreative right is also important as its intrinsic value and its relation to other 
rights could offer an answer which right should prevail in the case when procreative 
right conflict with some other rights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The procreation is grounded in the strong interest of creating a child which can 
be motivated by many different reasons such as to give meaning or add value 
to life, to carry on the family name, to be like other friends, to give in to family 
pressure, to pass on genes to the next generation, and etc.1 The procreation is 
considered to be central to individual identity and there is a consensus that 
everyone can freely choose when, whether, and how many children to have. 
However, the procreative right is not explicitly guaranteed as a human right 
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (ECHR).2 ECHR regulates the right to marry and to found a 
family and the right to private and family life. Thus, Article 8(1) of the ECHR 
prescribes that the private and family life, home and correspondence must be 
respected. Article 12 of the ECHR guarantees the rights to marry and to found 
a family to men and women of marriageable age, according to the national 
laws that are governing the exercise of this right.
The notion that the semantic content of the procreative right is absent from 
ECHR imposes the question whether the procreative right is the legal right 
that can be derived from the right to marry and to found a family or the right 
to private and family life. The answer to that question can be positive if we 
accept assumption that legal norms that regulate private and family life have 
certain value or they serve to some interest, purpose or enforce some principle 
that exists independently of the rule itself. However, the existent interpreta-
tion does not per se serve to the underlying interest, purpose or principle and 
thus may have to be interpreted differently. When that interpretative attitude 
is adopted towards a legal norm that regulates the right to private and family 
life, the legal norm of the ECHR is no longer applied automatically. Instead, 
the content of the legal norm that regulates the private and family life becomes 
more dependent on the values underlying it. That kind of interpretative atti-
tude is recognized by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) whose 
case law has been particularly relevant in determining whether procreative 
right could be derived as legal right from right marry and to found a family 
(Article 12 ECHR) or right to private and family life (Article 8(1) ECHR). 
1 Boivin J, Pennings G. (2005). Parenthood should be regarded as a right. Archives of Dis-
ease in Childhood, 90(8), 784-785. doi:10.1136/adc.2004.064485.
2 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, avail-
able at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [accessed 20 January 2020].
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Although at first glance it seems that the appropriate basis for promoting and 
protecting interest to procreate can be found in the right to marry and to found 
a family (Article 12 ECHR), the ECtHR thinks that it is difficult to interpret it 
as procreative right.3The reason for that standpoint lies in the notion that the 
right to marry and to found a family entails a narrow understanding of what 
constitutes a family, requires the existence of a couple and does not protect the 
right to procreate.4 However, the ECtHR analysis of Article 8(1) of the ECHR 
supported the putative right to procreate and recognized its applicability to 
access to the assisted procreative facilities. 
As procreative right is not explicitly guaranteed by ECHR but interpreted from 
norms of Article 8(1), the author will first analyze the scope of the procreative 
right under the notion of the ECtHR case law. Then the procreative right de-
fined by ECtHR will be further analyzed from standpoint of Hohfeld analysis 
of law to define its content and legal relations that procreative rights create 
among procreators, child and third persons involved in procreation process. 
Then the right to procreate will be confronted with the rights of other partic-
ipants in the procreation process that is determined with the help of Hohfeld 
analysis. To see which right will prevail in the case of the conflict of rights, the 
Griffin theory of human rights will be used. In conclusion, the author will give 
a review of what happens when the procreative right conflicts with the rights 
of the child or the third party (e.g. surrogate mother). Also in the conclusion, 
the author will offer the answer to the question of how the conflict can be 
resolved and whether can it result with the limitation of the procreative right.
2. INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCREATIVE RIGHT UNDER 
ARTICLE 8(1) OF ECHR IN THE LIGHT OF ECTHR CASE LAW
In the case, Evans v the United Kingdom the applicant was a woman who 
wished to have implanted the embryos that are created through artificial in-
semination facility.5 The embryos were created by using woman’s eggs and 
the sperm of her ex-partner.6 However, the woman’s ex-partner withdrawal 
consents to embryo use by her.7The interest of woman and her ex-partner to 
3 Palomares, G. C. (2016).Right to Family Life and Access to Medically Assisted Procre-
ation in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, In M. G. Pascual and A. T. 
Pérez (Eds.),The Right to Family Life in the European Union (pp. 99-114). New York: Rout-
ledge.
4 Ibid.
5 Case of Evans v the United Kingdom, Application No. 6339/05, Judgement 10 April 2007.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
Intereulaweast, Vol. VII (1) 2020
92
become genetic parents were irreconcilable, and the right to private life as a 
procreative right, according to the ECtHR interpretation, did not serve the 
interest of respect for human dignity and free will, nor to a desire to ensure 
a fair balance between them.8 To strike a fair balance between the competing 
interests of the woman and her ex-partner, the ECtHR concluded that right to 
respect the decision to become a genetically related mother carried no more 
weight than the right to respect for the decision not to have a genetically relat-
ed child with the mother.9 In its judgment, the ECtHR for the first time inter-
preted the right to private life, guaranteed by Article 8(1) ECHR, as the pro-
creative right that serves to protect the underlying interest of men and woman 
to make a decision to (not) become parents in the genetic sense.10
In the judgment Dickson v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR extended pro-
creative right to right to family life by interpreting the right to family life as 
the right to access to artificial insemination facilities.11The applicants were a 
couple whom both wanted to conceive a child through artificial insemination 
guaranteed by domestic law which was the only way they could become par-
ents in the genetic sense as the man was a prisoner with a minimum 15-year 
sentence to serve for murder.12Because of the age of the woman they had little 
chance of conceiving after men release. The ECtHR considered that in this 
case, the value of the right to family life is to protect the interest to access 
to the artificial insemination facilities to achieve genetic reproduction, which 
should not be restricted by the public interest to hold trust in the penal system 
or by the interests of the future child.13
In both previous judgments, the ECtHR has interpreted the right to private 
and family life as the right that protects interest to become the parent in the 
genetic sense and the interest to have access to artificial insemination facili-
ties. Besides, the issue of applicability of Article 8 is not controversial since 
access to medically assisted procreation was in both cases guaranteed under 
the domestic law. By contrast, in the cases of S.H. and Others v Austria, and 
Costa and Pavan v Italy, domestic law prohibited in general terms the access 
to some artificial insemination facilities that the applicants wanted to use - 
heterologous techniques in S.H., and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in 
Costa and Pavan.
8 Case of Dickson v the United Kingdom, Application No. 44362/04, Judgement 4 December 
2012.
9 Case of Evans v the United Kingdom, op. cit. (fn. 5).
10 Ibid.
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In its judgment S.H. and Others v Austria, the ECtHR found that the right of 
two couples to conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted pro-
creation for that purpose was protected by Article 8, as such a choice was an 
expression of private and family life.14The ECtHR considered that concerns 
based on moral considerations or the social acceptability of medically assisted 
procreation must be taken seriously but they are not in themselves sufficient 
reasons for a complete ban on a specific artificial procreation technique such 
as ovum donation.15
In the judgement Costa and Pavan v Italy, the ECtHR decided that the procre-
ative right should be interpreted in the terms of the right to family life (Article 
8(1) of the ECHR) even in the situations when the use of medically assisted 
procreation and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is reserved for couples that 
are neither sterile nor infertile.16 Thus, the ECtHR identified the breach of pro-
creative right for the Italian couple that were not sterile or infertile but wanted 
to conceive the child with the help of the artificial insemination facilities to 
have pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for the genetic disease (cystic fibro-
sis) of which they were carriers and that could be passed to their potential fu-
ture child. By this decision, the ECtHR not only interpreted procreative right 
from Article 8(1) of the ECHR but it created new “autonomous” right that did 
not exist before in the domestic legal system.17
3. REDEFINING THE PROCREATIVE RIGHT
The ECtHR by its interpretation gave to the private and family life, the mean-
ing of the right to have genetic children without actions of the state that pro-
hibit or restrict access to artificial insemination facilities as it undermines the 
individual autonomy to procreate which is the only concern of the individual.
Thus interpreted private and family right can be summed up to the notion of 
the procreative right which is a bundle of various Hohfeldian elements.18 In 
Hohfeld’s terms, procreation involves the liberty of the legal subject that is by 
the legal norm, that guarantees private and family life, entitled to have chil-
dren by natural conception or with the help of the artificial insemination facil-
14 Case of S. H. and Others v. Austria, Application No. 57813/00, Judgement 3 November 
2011.
15 Ibid.
16  Costa and Pavan v Italy, Application No. 54270/10, Judgement 28 August 2012.
17 Ibid.
18 Hohfeld, W. N. (1917). Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
The Yale Law Journal, 26(8),  pp.710-770.DOI: 10.2307/786270.
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ities. The procreative liberty, as the norm of the ECtHR judicature identifies, is 
and should be protected from any physical interference in its implementation 
or omission of its performance. That means even the protection from the leg-
islator who could prohibit procreation with legal norms. The procreative right 
also gives to the procreators the power to alter their legal relations or legal re-
lations of as actors involved in procreation (e.g. donors of reproductive cells, 
medical intuitions and state) and as well of the prospective child or children. 
The norms that regulate the private and the family right also give to the legal 
subjects the claim-right to procreate without of interference by anyone else, 
including the state into his/her decision to have children (negative right to 
procreate). Depending on one’s view of interference, the duty not to interfere 
might prohibit such things as restrictions regarding access to artificial insem-
ination facilities that aim to help in bypassing the procreation obstacles (e.g. 
infertility). However, if we argue for a positive right to procreate, this includes 
a claim-right to assistance and duty on others through the state to provide 
it. That would mean, for example, that the medical institutions would have 
the duty to make available artificial insemination facilities to all without any 
restrictions. Finally, the procreative right involves immunities, in that others, 
including the state, cannot derogate (are disabled from derogating) the procre-
ative claim rights, liberties, and powers of the prospective procreators.
On the other hand, the procreation creates the child, which is a new life that is 
the genesis of the state’s interest. If the new life, and thus the state’s interest, 
has its origin in the conduct of procreation, then procreation itself could be 
the subject to the state’s control. Conceptually, then, there is no personal au-
tonomy in the decision to create the child, which is essentially interpersonal. 
Not procreating is personal but procreating is interpersonal. This distinction 
takes procreation out of the rubric of private and personal acts, defining the 
first limitations on the procreative right.19Thus, the procreative liberty is not 
absolute or unrestricted liberty, yet it may rightfully be curtailed when the 
procreation causes excessive harm to the community or to the child himself 
or herself.20 In that sense, the procreative right includes powers of the state 
over the procreator and the others who automatically enter into legal relations 
that aim to create the prospective child or children, and as well powers over 
the prospective child or children themselves. Hosts of liabilities are likewise 
created by the act of procreation, including those upon the state, with special 
liabilities for co-procreators and other persons associated with the prospective 
child or children. 
19 Dillard, Carter J. (2007). Rethinking the Procreative Right, Yale Human Rights and Devel-
opment Journal, 10(1), pp. 3-63.
20 Ibid.
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4. THE RESTRICTION OF THE PROCREATIVE RIGHT
The procreative right has intrinsic values such as immortality through descend-
ants, living vicariously through one’s children, getting a “second chance,” in-
timate relations with one’s offspring, the satisfaction of the longing for home 
or nest with close relations and belonging, and the interest of couples to found 
a family.21 Those intrinsic values of procreative right reflect in “the central 
importance to individual meaning, dignity, and identity” and as well are of a 
“great significance for personal identity and happiness”.22 In order words, the 
procreation could be interpreted as the right that is intrinsically valuable for 
every human being as it serves for its self-fulfillment. However, the procrea-
tive right cannot be understood in isolation, as it represents the act of creating 
another person. Thus, the procreative right creates particular legal relations 
between several legal subjects that are involved in the process of childbearing 
and can easily come into the conflict with their right and values that are un-
derlying them. If we accept the theory of John Griffin that the rights have dif-
fering weights relative to the values they protect, the value of self-fulfillment 
that is protected by procreative right can, for example, come into the conflict 
with values of different child rights.23
It especially comes into question in the example of the surrogacy when one of 
the commissioning parents does not have a genetic link with the child. If we 
interpret surrogacy as an artificial reproductive facility that may help individ-
uals and couples to become genetic parents when other methods of reproduc-
tion are not successful or applicable to their life situation, then we can easily 
claim that surrogacy aims to achieve the fulfillment of the procreative right. 
However, surrogacy creates a legal relationship between commissioning par-
ents, surrogacy mother and the child, which all have specific rights that arise 
from that particular legal relationship. If their rights and its underlying values 
come in conflict, according to J. Griffin, the right is weightier if it is more 
central to the personhood of its holder.24 Let us again assume that procreative 
21 Shanner, L. (1995). The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong, Mc-
Gill Law Journal, 40(4), pp. 823-874.; Statman, D. (2003). The Right to Parenthood: An Argu-
ment for a Narrow Interpretation, Ethical Perspect, 10(3-4), pp. 224-235.
22 Robertson, J. A. (1995). Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response to 
My Critics, Washington Lee Law Review, 52(1), pp. 233-267.; Priaulx, N. (2008). Rethinking 
Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive Autonomy Matters, Medical Law Review, 16(2), pp. 
169–200. https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fwn009.
23 Griffin, J. (2001). Rights in Conflict, In M. Friedman, L. May, K. Parson, J. Stiff (Eds.), 
Rights and Reason: Essays in Honor of Carl Wellman (pp. 105-120). Springer – Science &Bus-
siness Media, B. V.
24 Ibid.
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right supposes the value of procreator’s self-fulfillment which could be impor-
tant in defining him as a person. On the other hand, in case of surrogacy, if at 
least one gamete is donated, the procreative right and its intrinsic value can, 
for example, conflict with the certain right of the child that does not carry the 
same intrinsic value as procreative right. 
Thus, the procreative right can come into the conflict with the child’s right to 
know the parents, guaranteed by Article 7(1) of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), and the values that this right protects.25 The right to know 
the parents is central to child’s personhood as it defines child’s identity that 
is interrelated with the notion of genetic origins that gives a true and genuine 
personal, legal and family identity.26Therefore, besides the right to know the 
parents, the procreative right can come into the conflict with the right to an 
identity that is guaranteed by Article 8 of the CRC.27The intrinsic value of 
those rights was confirmed by the ECtHR, which held that it is from vital in-
terest for every human being to receive the information necessary to uncover 
the truth about an important aspect of their personal identity.28Moreover, the 
empiric research confirmed that the genetic origins are essential for physical 
and psychosocial well-being and that consequently, lack of access to this in-
formation constitutes actual harm.29
On the other hand, the procreative right in the case of surrogacy arrangements 
can come into the conflict with the surrogate mother’s right not to be subject-
ed to inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR) or the right that her 
body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain (Article 21 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No 164) (CHRB)). In other words, the 
value of self-fulfillment can come into the conflict with the value of dignity, 
which outweighs, as the surrogate mother is often seen as a means to reach the 
intending procreation goal. As the role of the surrogate mother is to provide 
25 Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3.
26 Hodgson, D. (1993). The international legal protection of the child’s rights to a legal identi-
ty and the problem of statelessness, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 7(2), 
pp. 255–270. https://doi.org/10.1093/lawfam/7.2.255; Wade, K. (2017). The regulation of sur-
rogacy: a children’s rights perspective, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 29(2), pp. 113–131.; 
Ravitsky, V. (2017). The right to know one’s genetic origins and cross-border medically assist-
ed reproduction, IsraelJournal of Health Policy Research, 6(3), pp. 2-3. doi: 10.1186/s13584-
016-0125-0.
27 Convention on the Rights of the Child, op. cit. (fn. 25).
28 Hodgson, D., op. cit. (fn. 26), pp. 255–270.; Wade, K. op. cit. (fn. 26), pp. 113–131.; Rav-
itsky, V. op. cit. (fn. 26), pp. 2-3. doi: 10.1186/s13584-016-0125-0.
29 Ibid.
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a service to the intending parents, her body and, more precisely, her womb is 
used as a true object. Thus, the achievement of procreation through surrogacy 
arrangement means nothing more than the commodification of the surrogate 
mother that is used as a human incubator. 
5. CONCLUSION
It is natural for human beings to have a desire to have genetic children as 
they can bring an increased sense of meaning into their lives. Thus, not hav-
ing children imply not attaining plenitude, not being ontologically fulfilled. 
The procreative right is also recognized as an important right interpreted by 
ECtHR from right to private and family life (Article 8(1) ECHR). To achieve 
procreation goal, the individuals and the couples have the freedom to decide 
whether to have children without the interference of others, including the state 
and the power to alter their legal relations or legal relations of the actors in-
volved in the procreation process. In addition, the procreative right gives the 
prospective procreators the claim right to the state and the others to sustain 
from interference into their decision to procreate or even the claim right to 
the state to enable them access to artificial insemination facilities if they need 
help to have a genetic child. However, we cannot say that the prospective pro-
creators should be immune from derogation of their procreative claim rights, 
liberties, and powers. The reason for this standpoint is especially noticeable 
when the enjoyment of having a genetic child is fully dependent on artifi-
cial insemination facilities. In that case, exercising the procreative right could 
help potential procreators to achieve the intrinsic value of self-fulfillment; 
however, it may conflict with the rights of other actors of procreation process 
and with values that those rights protect or aim to achieve for their holders. 
If we take an example of surrogacy, which is among some considered as new 
artificial insemination facility, the procreative right conflicts with the child 
right to know his/her parents and right to identity and as well with surrogate 
mother’s right to bodily integrity. When these rights conflict the question is 
which right should prevail? According to the J. Griffin theory of rights, pri-
ority needs to be given to the right with intrinsic value that is more important 
to the personhood. Thus, in the case of surrogacy, the value of procreator’s 
self-fulfillment may confront with values of self-identity and dignity. That 
leads us to the conclusion that in procreation arrangements such as surrogacy, 
children are at the mercy of adult decision-making that only aims to pursue 
adult happiness and personal fulfillment by manufacturing a child into exist-
ence through procreation technologies. We should not forget that the children 
are not the commodity and they should not exist for the fulfillment of adults. 
Therefore, children’s rights should not be abused in favor of adult desires, 
especially through the normalization and promotion of family structures and 
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technological advancements that require a child to lose their identity by los-
ing a mother or father. Also in surrogacy arrangements, the procreative right 
conflicts with surrogate mother’s right to bodily integrity as she uses her body 
as an instrument for the financial gain which causes conflict between intrinsic 
values of the self-fulfillment of potential procreators (individuals or couple) 
and intrinsic value of surrogate mother dignity. The value of self-fulfillment 
should not prevail over the value of dignity, as, by their nature, humans are not 
entities that can be instrumentalized and used as mere means to an end.30Al-
though it is not acceptable to interfere with one’s procreative right, as it is an 
intimate and personal area of human life, the procreative right should not be 
unlimited. Intentionally depriving children of their right to know and to have 
contact with their biological parents and wider family, or their right to be born 
from natural biological origins, or depriving children and surrogate mothers 
from their right not to use body parts as commodity represent a severe breach 
of human rights and their intrinsic values. Therefore, we must not forget that 
all these rights are central to the personhood of the child and the surrogate 
mother and cannot be traded off with procreative right that rests on the value 
of the self-fulfillment and which strives to make children an object designed 
for adults’ selfish desires.
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